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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. MURPHY, dba ALEX PICKERING TRANSFER COMPANY,
Pwintiff,

vs.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, REDMAN MOVING & STORAGE
COMPANY, BARTON TRUCK LINE, INC.,
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, MAGNA- GARFIELD TRUCK LINE, PALMER BROTHERS, INC., RIO GRANDE MOTOR WAY,
INC., MILNE TRUCK LINES, INC., ASHWORTH TRANSFER, INC., BILLS MOVING, INC., A-ONE MOVING AND DELIVERY, LEWIS BROS. STAGE LINES,
UTAH PACKAGE EXPRESS, INC., DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD, PARK CITY TRUCK LINES, INC.,

Case No.
12920

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED THE PREMISE ON
WHICH THE COMMISSION PREDICATED ITS ORDER OF JULY 10, 1972.
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By its Order of July 10, 1972, the Commission
determined that where a contract carrier had not filed
any contracts or tarriffs from the 23rd day of December, 1954, to the 28th day of March, 1972, future implementation of its service required the assent of the
Commission in accordance with Section 54-6-8, Utah
Code Annotated ( 1953, as amended). In support of
this conclusion, the Commission cited ]}Jilne Truck

Lines, Inc. v. Puhlic Service Commission of Utah, et.
al., 18 U. 2d 72, 368 P. 2d 590 ( 1962).

This Court erroneously concluded that the Commission's citation of the JJJ ilne case was improper because, ". . . in the Milne case there were two possible
interpretations of the term 'general commodities' as
used in the granted authority." However, the Commission did not cite the lJiilne case for the proposition
referred to by this Court. Rather, the 1llilne case was
cited as support for the Commission's conclusion that ia
contract carrier permit that had been dormant for 17
years and 4 months could not be revived without the
Commission's review of the effect of such a revival on
existing competing motor carriers and a finding that
the same would not be determined to the best interests
of the people of the State of Utah. In Milne Truck

Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Utah,
supra, Justice Callister stated at 18 U. 2d 75:
"Recognizing that one purpose of this legislation was to prevent unfair and destructive
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service, this court has held that the Commismon's assent was necessary before a carrier
could increase its service, even though the scope
of its service was not expressly limited in the
carrier's certificate. The same principle is applicable to the case now before us. To allow
Milne and other general commodity carriers
to transport petroleum and petroleum products in tank vehicles without first determining
that such service is necessary and in the public
interest, would not only be contrary to our
statutory purpose, but would substantially
impede the regu"latory function of the Public
Service Commismon." (Emphasis added)
The Commission found, ". . . that the motor carrier complaintants have made substantial investments
in equipment and facilities since the year 1954 and are
presently providing a transportation service in the
transportation of general commodities to the shipping
public." (R. 82) Evidence to support this finding includes the following:
In 1963, the complainant Barton Truck
Line, Inc. received total revenue of $1,282,263 of
which $564,195 was intrastate traffic subject to diversion by plaintiff's operations under its Contract Carrier
Permit No. 130 as interpreted by this Court. In 1971,
44% of a total revenue of $2,603,403 or $1,145,497
was subject to diversion by plaintiff. In addition,
43.66% of Barton's total number of shipments and
41.66% of the total weight carried by Barton constituted
( 1)

intrastate traffic within a 50 mile radius of Salt Lake
City, Utah (Ex. 10, T. 63). Barton has made substantial investments in facilities and equipment, including equipment purchases for delivery in June, 1972,
amounting to $498,000 (Ex. 7). The diversion of intrastate traffic within a 50 mile radius of Salt Lake
City, Utah would have a drastic effect on Barton, including the curtailment of service and the reduction of
schedules and labor force ( T. 68) ;
(2) From 1954 to 1971, the complainant Redman
Warehousing Corporation increased its net capital investment in buildings from $15,595 to $218,673 or
1,302% and revenue equipment from $33,079 to
$105,230 or an increase of 218% (Ex. 21). In 1971,
Redman had 789 shipments within a 50 mile radius of
Salt Lake City, Utah excluding the area covered by
local cartage certificates, which shipments produced a
revenue of $63,398.09. Revenue from shipments of
household goods within this area was estimated to be
$49,796 (Ex. 20);
( 3) General commodities shipments handled by
the complaint Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. for the
period of April 3 through April 7, 1972, between points
within the geographical area covered by plaintiff's
Contract Carrier Permit No. 130 constituted 258 shipments weighing 939,440 pounds with a revenue of
$3,323.69 (Ex. 14) ; and,
( 4)

In 1968, 51 % of the total revenue of Magna-
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Garfield Truck Line was generated by intrastate traffic
and in 1971 the figure was 52%.
The Commission's concern regarding the entry of
a new competitor into a presently highly competitive
area where existing carriers have made substantial investments and are dependent on such traffic for their
very existence is not only required by statute, Section
54-6-8, lJ tah Code Annotated ( 1953, as amended),
but is also required by this Court's interpretation of the
purpose of the Public Utilities Act. As stated in Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 67 U. 222,
247 P. 284 (1926) at 67 U. 236:

"The very purpose of the Utilities Act is to
prevent one public utility from destroying
another. When, therefore, it is made apparent

to the Commission that the increase of the
number of vehicles or trips by a common carrier which is using the public streets and highways must necessarily result in seriously affecting the ability of another utility to render
service, or perhaps destroy its ability to do so

* * * the

Commission undoubtedly may interfere to prevent such disasterous results. The
Commission was created for that very purpose,
and, where its orders are within its jurisdiction
and bounds of reason, and not capricious and
arbitrary, this court cannot interfere." (Emphasis added)

Contract Carrier Permit No. 130 ·authorizes plaintiff:

" . . to operate as a contract motor carrier of
all kinds of personal property including merchandise, machinery, and other property which
she has occasion to carry in the course of the
conduct of her said transportation business
within a fifty mile radius of Salt Lake City,
excluding pick up and delivery service within
the area described in Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity No. 684." (R. 81)
Plaintiff' contends that Contract Carrier Permit
No. 130 constitutes a, " ... general commodities contract
carrier permit ( s) , unrestricted as to any particular
shipper, and that prior hearing and approval of each
articular contract pursuant to Section 54-6-8, U.C.A.
19.'.>3, is not required before (plaintiff) may transport
goods under her contract carrier permit." ( R.89, 90)
In all practicality, plaintiff's definition as adopted by
this Court converts Contract Carrier Permit No. 130
to a common carrier operation without the inherent
obligation of a common carrier to serve the entire public
at published rates and charges. Plaintiff is free to
solicit and obtain the business of lucrative shippers by
the simple expedient of undercutting the published
tariffs of these defendants and leave the remaining
public shippers to pay the higher competing tariffs.
The refus al of the Commission to sanction such an
operation is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Rather,
the protection of existing competitors and public shippers is the statutory obligation of the Commission as
interpreted by this Court in IJ;Jilne Truck Lines, Inc.

7

v. Public Service Commission of Utah, supra, and Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, supra.
POINT II
THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY RESTRICTED THE SCOPE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION.
This Court vacated the Order of July 10, 1972,
on the apparent theory that the Commission had improperly restricted the scope of plaintiff's Contract
Carrier Permit No. 130. However, by the Order and
Notice of Hearing issued .May 12, 1972, plaintiff was
ordered to appear before the Commission:
" ... to show cause if any she (plaintiff) may
have, why Contract Carrier Permit No. 130
should not be altered or cancelled, and why the
Commission should not take such other and
further action as allowed by law." (R.53)
Section 54-6-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended) provides :
"The Commission may at any time for good
cause iand after notice and hearing, suspend,
alter, amend or revoke any certificate, permit
or license isued by it hereunder."
The latitude vested in the Commission by the above
quoted statutory provision was established by this Court
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m Provo Transfer and Storage Cornpany v. Public
Service Commission, 3 U. 2d 86, 278 P. 2d 985 (1955)
wherein it is stated:

"We do not sit in these certiorai proceedings
to determine whether the action taken by the
Commission is exactly to our liking. Suffice
it to say that it appears that the legislature
has ·vested in this administrative tribunal plenary powers to revoke and suspend certificates
of convenience for good cause . .. ". (Emphasis
added)
There is no statutory distinction between a certifi
cate, permit or license, and the rationale set forth in
Provo Transfer and Storage Company v Public Service Commission, supra, is applicable in each situation.
Therefore, even if this Court determined that the Commission's Order of July 10, 1972 constituted an alteration or amendment to plaintiff's Contract Carrier Permit No. 130, such action by the Commission was justified and statutorily sanctioned.
The "good cause" resulting m the alteration or
amendment to plaintiff's permit was the destructive
effect of plaintiff's expanded service after 17 years
and 4 months of relative dormancy on the existing transportation facilities that had invested substantial
in equipment and facilities and rendered an adequate
transportation service during plaintiff's period of inactivity. This destruction of competition would be deterimental to the interests of the people of the State of

Utah, and the Commission's single requirement that
plaintiff first obtain the assent of the Commission and
demonstrate the existence of the elements set forth in
Section 54-6-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) before expanding the service performed under Contract Carrier Permit 130 was not arbitrary and capric10us.
POINT III
THIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED ITS ORDER OF
NOVEMBER 17, 1954, WHEREIN THE
OPERATING RIGHT OF JOHN MURPHY WERE TRANSFERRED TO
PLAINTIFF.
In its Report and Order issued November 17, 1954,
the Commission transferred to Mary A. Murphy, Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 684 and Contract Carrier Permit No. 130. The Commission was
required to investigate the operation being conducted
by John M. Murphy at the time of his death because
Section 54-6-24, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) restricts the scope of the transferred right, permit,
certificate or license to the operation being conducted
by the deceased at that point in time.
The Commission was initially concerned with the
legality of the "grandfather permit" issued to John M.
Murphy because of the history surrounding the issuance
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of the permit and this Court's holding in ,JlcCarlhy,
et. al., v. Public Sert ice Commission of Utah, 94 U. 304,
77 P. 2d 331 ( 1938) wherein notice and hearings were
considered prerequisites to the issuance of grandfather
permits. Because the Commission had not complied with
the requirements announced by this Court in fflcCarthy,
et. al., t'. Public Ser'l'ice Commission of Utah, supra, it
was observed:
1

"Were this an application to transfer Contract Carrier Permit No. 130 to one other
than an heir of John M. Murphy, deceased,
the Commission would be compelled to deny
that part of the application on the ground
that no hearing was afforded interested
parties in the first instance and the operation has been conducted without strict attention to the provisions of the law relating to
the filing of proper tariffs." (R.100)
The Commission further determined, based on the
testimony of Charles E. Murphy, who actively conducted
the company's business," ... The only part of the authority being operated under Contract Carrier Permit No.
130 at the time of the death of John M. Murphy was
about twelve trips per year within a radius of 50 miles
of Salt Lake City." (R. 100).
Based on the hearing, the Commission limited Contract Carrier Permit No. 130, " ... to the area within
the State of Utah within a 50 mile radius of Salt Lake
City." (R. 100, 101). On the same evidence, the Commission further ordered:
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"That the above described certificate and
permit shall become effective twenty (20)
days from the date hereof upon the condition
that applicant files the necessary insurance
and tariffs, or contracts with respect to the
permit, in accordance with the Commission's
rules and regulations." ( R. 101 ) .
There were at least three justifications for requiring l\Iary A. Murphy to file "contracts with respect to
the permit" within twenty (20) days, to-wit: (1) the
fact the operation had been conducted without compliance to the legal requirements relating to the filing of
proper tariffs ( R. 100 ) ; ( 2 ) the fact that the only
operations conducted under Contract Carrier Permit No.
130 totalled, " ... about twelve trips per year within a
radius of 50 miles of Salt Lake City." (R. 100); and,
( 3) the fact that the only way the Commission had of
determining the scope of the operations being conducted
at the time of the death of John M. Murphy to comply
with the transfer statute, Section 54-6-24, Utah Code
Annotated ( 1953, as amended) , was to require the transferee to file existing contracts. Plaintiff did not appeal
this Order and, in fact, sought and obtained an extension
of time within which to file the required contracts.
In the instant proceeding, the Commission properly
recognized that a construction of Contract Carrier Permit No. 130 such as that rendered by this Court would
convert a " ... twelve trips per year... " (R.100) contract carrier operation to an unregulated and unsupervised open-ended general commodities contract carrier
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permit. To now expand the authority transferred to
Mary A ..Murphy pursuant to Section 54-6-24, Utah
Code Annotated (1953, as amended), in November,
1954, would violate that statutory provision and all of
the rules of construction previously announced by this
Court. As stated in Reavely v.
Service CommisS'ion, 20 U. 2d 237, 436 P. 2d 797 ( 1968), at 20 U.
2d 239-240:
"The Commission is best suited to say what its
orders mean, since it has the power to grant,
amend, or refuse certificates, and its determination is final as to facts so long as there is
competent evidence to justify them."
The justification of the Commission's Order of
July 10, 1972, is a comprehension of the Commission's
investigation and Findings set forth in the Report and
Order of November 17, 1954 (R. 97-102), and the
Commission's present reluctance to expand the authority
originally transferred to plaintiff without first ascertaining the affect of plaintiff's contemplated service on
existing competitors and the shipping public.
POINT IV
THIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 17, 1954, GRANTED A GENERAL
CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT.
This Court concluded that the condition m the
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Order of November 17, 1954, requiring plaintiff to file
contracts within twenty days, " ... was merely in accordance with Rule VII."
Defendancts respectfully submit that this conclusion
is erroneous for the following reasons: ( l) The Order
specifically states, " (t) hat the above described Certificate and Permit shall become effective twenty (20)
days from the date hereof upon the condition that applicant files the necessary . . . contracts with respect to
the permit ... "; ( 2) that this condition was a condition
precedent to the transferred permit becoming effective;
'and, ( 8) since the rules and regulations of the Commission already required such filings and all successful
applicants are required to abide thereby, the only reason
for specifically including the requirement in the Order
was to condition the effectiveness of the granted permit
on compliance therewith.
This action was the Commission's method af assuring compliance with its rules and regulations and it may
again be noted that plaintiff did not appeal this Order
but, instead, obtained an extension of time to comply
with the condition.
This Court's reference to Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion in
v. Public Service Commission,
111 U. 489, 184 P. 2d 220 (1947) is error because the
permit considered by the Commission in the instant proceeding was the permit transferred to plaintiff in
November, 1954, and not the original permit issued to
John Murphy. By reason of Section 54-6-24, Utah Code
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Annotated ( 1953, as amended), the transferred permit
was limited to the operation being conducted by John
Murphy at the time of his death.
However, even Justice ''rolfe's concurring opinion
contemplates Commission review and approval based
upon the applicant's showing of need, and the Commission is empowered to protect competing carriers.
As stated at J 11 U. 501:
"The permits could limit the hauls to such
distance as would prevent uniliue competition
wi,th the satisfactory common carriers of the
same comodities in the same area." (Emphasis
added)
The case of lJlcCarthy v. Public Service Commission, supra, was decided in 1947, approximately seven
years prior to the Commission's Order of November 17,
1954. Instead of appealing this Order, plaintiff obtained an extension of time within which to comply with the
condition. Had Justice Wolfe's observations been the
law, as assumed by this Court, the Commission's Order
of November 17, 1954, could have been reversed. Plaintiff should not be allowed an appeal 17 years and 4
months after the fact. Obviously, plaintiff admitted the
validity of the condition as a part of the transfer proceedings.
POINT V
THIS

COURT

ERRED

IN

C 0 M-
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PLETELY VACATING THE ORDER
OF JULY 10, 1972.
The decision of this Court in the instant proceeding
failed to distinguish between the issues relating to the
scope of plaintiff's Contract Carrier Permit No. 130
and the finding of the Commission that plaintiff had
ceased hauling traffic for Industrial Supply Company
as of January, 1962; that plaintiff had forfeited the
right to reinstitute said service; and, that plaintiff would
have to demonstrate a need prior to reinstituting said
service.
This finding was supported by the evidence and the
Order based thereon was pursuant to Rule No. 5 of the
Public Service Commission of Utah, Motor Carrier
Rules and Regulations No. 3, which provides in part:
"(b) All interruptions of regular service of
common carriers and contract motor carriers,
where such interruptions are likely to continue
for more than one scheduled trip shall be
promptly reported in writing to the Commission, with full statement of cause of interruption, and its probable duration.
" ( c) Discontinuance of service of a common
or contract motor carrier whether with or without notice to the Commission and the public,
shall be deemed a forfeiture of all rights
secured under and by virtue of any order or
permission to operate issued by the Commission, provided, however, that the Commission
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may permit resumption of operation on a
proper showing that the carrier was not responsible for the failure to give service, and
on. a . finding by ,,the Commission that the service is necessary.
By vacating this Order, this Court holds that plaintiff may reinstitute service or initiate new service without demonstrating a public need or inadequacy of existing service. This is an untenable extension of a contract carrier permit transferred to plaintiff at a time
when the only operation conducted thereunder was
twelve ( 12) trips per year.
SUMMARY
For the reasons herein stated, defendants respectfully submit that their Petition for Rehearing be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS & RICHARDS
By--------William S. Richards

Attorneys for Defendnts
900 Walker Bank Building

Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

